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... [Y]ou are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution
for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own
importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less
than . . . the fate of an empire in many respects the most
interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that
it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country,
by their conduct and example, to decide the important ques-
tion, whether societies of men are really capable or not of es-
tablishing good government from reflection and choice, or
whether they are forever destined to depend for their political
constitutions on accident and force .... [A] wrong election of
the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be consid-
ered as the general misfortune of mankind.'
So begins the extraordinary set of essays now known as The
Federalist Papers. Even as Publius begins his address to fellow
Americans, he reminds them that the world is watching. The suc-
cess or failure of the American experiment in self-rule, says Pub-
lius, might well determine the fate of republican government for all
humanity. In this belief Publius was hardly unique. Indeed, he
notes that the importance of the American experiment for the rest
of the planet "has been frequently remarked." Even in 1787, this
idea was very old. We need only recall grade-school civics: the Pu-
ritans who began arriving in America in the early seventeenth cen-
tury sought to establish a New England that would serve as a
model not just for the Old England, but for the entire Old World.
Nor was this idea limited to the generations that founded the
colonies and the Constitution. Consider, for example, the words of
Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War. In his second
Annual Message to Congress in 1862, Lincoln self-consciously de-
fined the meaning of America's domestic schism in global terms:
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"We say we are for the Union. The world will not forget that we
say this .... We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best
hope of earth."'2 To the same effect was his Gettysburg Address:
"Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether [our]
nation or any nation . .. conceived [in liberty and] dedicated [to
equality] can long endure. . . . The world [cannot] forget what
[American soldiers] did here [so] that government of the people,
by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth." 3
In this essay, I propose that we take Publius and Lincoln at
their word, and consider some lessons that the New World experi-
ment in republican government can offer to an Old World in the
pangs of political rebirth. I do not mean to suggest that the Ameri-
can tradition merits full-fledged replication abroad. Nor is such
replication likely; the draft constitutions of most Eastern Euro-
pean countries rightly reflect the countries' own traditions, and
those of Western Europe, at least as much as they reflect the
American experience. I simply suggest that the American experi-
ence does have some valuable lessons to offer as Eastern Europe
goes through the process of constitution-making.
I despair of any hope of comprehensiveness-the topic is far
too vast, and my knowledge far too small. I therefore propose to
limit my remarks to three areas in which the American Constitu-
tion is generally considered to have made distinctive contributions
and to have enjoyed considerable success. I shall examine the ways
in which the United States Constitution has established an ex-
tended republic based on democratic principles; a unique system of
power-sharing between center and periphery (federalism); and ci-
vilian supremacy over the military. In the course of examining
these three interrelated-or so I shall argue-topics, I shall place
considerable emphasis on the early American experience for two
reasons. First, although late twentieth-century Eastern Europeans
can learn much from their contemporary American counterparts,
and vice versa, the effort now underway in Eastern Europe to
found the right traditions and frame the right legal structures
raises distinctive issues of founding and framing, issues impor-
tantly illuminated by America's early Founders and Framers. Sec-
ond, several of the lessons from the early American experience may
prove relevant- today at home as well as abroad-and yet are in
danger of being forgotten on both sides of the Atlantic.
2 Roy P. Basler, ed, 5 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 537 (Rutgers, 1953).
3 7 id at 23.
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Although my discussion shall make regular reference to the
text of our constitution, we must remember that the document
that emerges at the end of a constitution-making process is just
that-a piece of paper. It cannot guarantee liberty and security
unless it is first designed with a keen awareness of the likely
threats to these two aims, and then executed and enforced over a
period of many years by individuals who scrupulously respect its
architecture and purposes. As we shall see, geography and history
forge constitutions every bit as much as the framers who put pen
to paper and the ratifiers who formally turn words into law.
I. AN EXTENDED DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
The American Constitution was absolutely novel in attempting
to extend republican government over an expansive geographic
area-truly, across a continent.4 Previous historical examples of
self-governing societies were much more geographically limited, the
classic examples being the early Greek city-states and pre-imperial
Rome. Orthodox political theorists in the 1780s, represented in
America by the Anti-Federalists, argued that this was no accident.
Democracy, they argued, was inherently incapable of being ex-
tended across a vast realm.5
Most constitutional scholars today are aware of this contro-
versy. They are also aware of two of Publius's arguments against
Anti-Federalist orthodoxy. First, Hamilton argued in Federalist 9
that the work of "the celebrated Montesquieu" 6 actually supported
the Anti-Federalists far less than they supposed, for Montesquieu
had suggested that a "confederate republic" could avoid some of
the geographic limitations inherent in simple democracies.7 Sec-
ond, and more familiar today, Madison built on the ideas of David
Hume' by arguing in Federalist 10 that an extended republic was
Not all Framers envisioned that their new nation would stretci to the Pacific; yet
virtually all did foresee that the nation would grow westward to include, for example, the
old Northwest Territory. The Constitution provided for the admission of new states, but
clearly suggested that new states would develop through the addition of new territory rather
than through merger or division of existing states, which Article IV forbids without the
consent of the states concerned. Thus, the clause about new states was immediately followed
by language discussing territories. US Const, Art IV, § 3.
For a representative sample of Anti-Federalist thought, see Cecilia Kenyon, ed, The
Antifederalists (Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).
' The phrase is Madison's. Federalist 47 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Pa-
pers at 301 (cited in note 1).
Federalist 9 (Hamilton), in id at 74.
See Douglass Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers 93-106 (Norton, 1974); Gary
Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist 223-30 (Doubleday, 1981).
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more likely to control factionalism, the characteristic vice of self-
governing societies."
A. Publius's Forgotten Vision
What is striking, however, is that scholars today are generally
unaware of Publius's earlier and most basic argument against the
Anti-Federalists, which I call the "geostrategic" argument. The en-
tire introductory section of The Federalist Papers was designed to
address head-on the Anti-Federalist orthodoxy about geography
and democracy; Federalists 9 and 10 came onto the scene relatively
late. What was Publius's argument for Union before he finally
reached 9 and 10? Distilling the analysis of Federalists 4 through 8,
I would paraphrase 0 the argument as follows:
Rampant despotism reigns over almost all of the Euro-
pean continent in 1787, yet England is relatively free." Why?
In part, no doubt, because of the magnificence of the common
law, and the glorious English Constitution, but also because of
England's unique "insular" condition. 12 As an island, she is
protected from the military depredations of her neighbors by
the English Channel. So long as Britannia maintains a strong
navy and rules the waves (remember 1588), she need not
overly concern herself with the horrible prospect of invasion.13
Navies, moreover, are relatively defensive creatures that can-
not easily be turned upon Englishmen to impose domestic tyr-
anny.14 Large standing armies are another story-the story,
indeed, of tyranny. Yet regimes on the continent of Europe
may well require such armies to defend land borders against
invasion.'5 Tragically, land borders often lead to a race to the
Federalist 10 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 82-83 (cited in note
1).
10 I have chosen to paraphrase here in order to save the reader's time. I of course urge
all interested readers to read Federalists 4 through 8-especially 8-for themselves. To
make things easier, I have liberally seasoned my paraphrase with page citations.
11 See especially Federalist 8 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 66-
71 (cited in note 1).
12 Id at 70.
13 Id ("An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding [Great Britain] against
the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of a numerous army within the
kingdom.").
14 Id ("The military state becomes elevated above the civil."); see also id at 66-68 (link-
ing "standing armies" and loss of "liberty").
15 See generally Federalist 8 (Hamilton); see also Federalist 5 (Jay), in id at 51 ("bor-
dering nations [are] always... either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant
apprehension of them") (emphasis in original).
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bottom in which a single ambitious regime arming itself for
military adventurism forces each of its neighbors to build up
its army to deter and (if necessary) repel invasion. 16
But armies beget strong executives to lead them, and the
combination begets domestic tyranny. Unlike navies, armies
can easily be used not just to thwart invaders, but to crush
domestic liberty.17 The task for Americans, then, is to struc-
ture our affairs to avoid the general fate of the European Con-
tinent,18 as the English have done with a God-given moat (the
Channel) and the Swiss with a God-given rampart (the Great
Wall of the Alps). 9
The existing Articles of Confederation have proved ut-
terly unworkable; the existing confederation is de facto dis-
solved.20 Suppose we were to replace the Confederation with
thirteen separate nations, each with land borders with its
neighbors, free to arm itself without limit. Each nation-state
would undoubtedly raise an army, ostensibly to protect itself
against Indians or British, French, or Spanish outposts, but
also to intimidate its neighbors. We would then recreate conti-
nental Europe and the near-universal tyranny that character-
izes that continent.2 To opt instead for a system of three or
four smaller confederacies (perhaps a Northern, a Southern,
and one or two mid-Atlantic leagues) would not be much bet-
ter,22 especially given the tremendous conflict that will pre-
dictably arise concerning control of the West.2 If, however, an
unum can be forged from pluribus, America will resemble
England.2 4 The three-thousand mile wide Atlantic ocean will
be America's moat, for it will protect her against replication
of, and subjugation by, the militarism of the European Conti-
nental powers. We can rely primarily on a modestly sized
navy.
16 Federalist 8 (Hamilton), in id at 68.
17 Id.
Id at 70-71.
19 Federalist 19 (Madison and Hamilton), in id at 133 (Swiss "are kept together by the
peculiarity of their topographical position").
20 Federalist 1 (Hamilton), in id at 37; Federalist 8 (Hamilton), in id at 71.
21 See generally Federalist 8 (Hamilton).
22 Federalist 2 (Jay), in id at 37-38, 41; Federalist 3 (Jay), in id at 43; Federalist 4 (Jay),
in id at 48-49; Federalist 5 (Jay), in id at 51-53; Federalist 8 (Hamilton), in id at 71.
23 Federalist 7 (Hamilton), in id at 60-62 ("Territorial disputes have at all times been
found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations .... This cause would exist
among us in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory.").
24 Federalist 5 (Jay), in id at 50-51; see generally Federalist 8 (Hamilton).
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To be sure, the new nation might require a very small
army to fortify the South and West against Indians, and the
North against Canada, but none of these land-bordering re-
gimes can truly threaten the united states, or provide the
president a pretext to create a dangerously large standing
army.25 Unless, of course, one of the land-bordering regimes
received strong support from the Old Powers in Europe,
whom Americans must discourage from strengthening their
footholds in the New World.26 And once again, united states
would be more likely to discourage European adventurism,
disabling the Old Powers from playing state -off against state
in classic divide-and-conquer fashion.
Here, then, is the first and most elaborate of Publius's three
main responses to the Anti-Federalists. It is also the response in
which the triumvirate sharing the mask of Publius-John Jay, Al-
exander Hamilton, and James Madison-most clearly spoke with
one voice. Hamilton, for example, had expressed real doubts in his
notes at the Philadelphia convention about the line of argument
that eventually became Madison's Federalist 10,28 whereas
Madison's June 29 speech at Philadelphia almost perfectly antici-
pated Jay's and Hamilton's geostrategic argument for the Union in
Federalists 4 through 8.29 Madison returned to this theme in Fed-
eralist 41, where he carefully cross-referenced and elaborated the
geostrategic argument of the early Federalist Papers.30
Others shared Publius's geostrategic vision. The geostrategic
argument was a dominant strand in the pro-ratification speeches of
James Wilson, perhaps the most farsighted Federalist theorist.31
So too, Benjamin Franklin, the grand old man of the Philadelphia
convention, invoked the vision in private correspondence shortly
after the convention adjourned.2 Nor is there any doubt that
George Washington, the Federalists' political standard-bearer,
25 Federalist 4 (Jay), in id at 49.
26 Id; Federalist 5 (Jay), in id at 53; Federalist 7 -(Hamilton), in id at 65-66.
27 See sources cited in note 26.
25 Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 145-47, 308-09
(Yale, rev ed 1937).
2, Id at 463-65.
30 Federalist 41 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 258-61 (cited in
note 1).
'" See Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption
of the Federal Constitution 527-29 (Taylor & Maury, 1854) (remarks of James Wilson at
Pennsylvania ratifying convention in 1787).




shared this vision. As a surveyor and general, Washington instinc-
tively grasped geography and military strategy much better than
he did abstruse debates about Montesquieu and Hume. Indeed,
Washington devoted major portions of his Presidential Farewell
Address (composed with help from each member of the Publian
triumvirate) to the implications of Publian geostrategy.33
B. The Early American Experience
The geostrategic argument provides a better window onto the
American political and legal landscape from 1788 to 1865 than
does the now-canonical Federalist 10. If, as Federalist 10 asserts,
states were indeed widely understood in 1789 as more threatening
to liberty than was the national government, then surely much of
the original Bill of Rights should have applied against the states.
So Madison urged in the first Congress, only to see the Senate
eliminate all of his proposed restrictions on state governments.3,4
The Bill of Rights restricted only the federal government, the gov-
ernment with control of the ever-dangerous army, as Chief Justice
John Marshall made clear in Barron v Baltimore."5 And lest there
be any doubt, the Second and Third Amendments confirmed
American jealousy against the army3 6 while saying nothing about
the navy-precisely in keeping with Publius's geostrategic
argument.37
President Jefferson also offered a vision of the Union far closer
to the geostrategic one than to that of Federalist 10. He regularly
described the raison d'etre of the federal government as defense
and international affairs, utterly ignoring Federalist 10's argument
about the need to protect individuals from tyrannical factionalism
33 See Richard B. Morris, ed, Great Presidential Decisions 29-47 (Lippincott, rev ed
1967).
[Elvery part of our country... must derive from union an exemption from those broils
and wars between themselves which so frequently afflict neighboring countries not tied
together by the same governments .... [L]ikewise, they will avoid the necessity of
those overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are in-
auspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican
liberty.
Id at 37-38.
", See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131
(1991).
35 32 US 243 (1833).
'e See Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1162-75 (cited in note 34).
a US Const, Amend II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."); US
Const, Amend IH ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.").
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within individual states. 8 Jefferson's actions spoke even louder
than his words when in 1803 he knowingly betrayed his own can-
ons of constitutional construction to purchase Louisiana from
France in keeping with the geostrategy sketched out in Federalists
4 through 8." The Monroe Doctrine promulgated in 1823 gave fur-
ther voice to this approach. 0
Consider also the most important and insightful nineteenth-
century commentary on the Constitution, Joseph Story's 1833
treatise:
It has been proudly said by a learned commentator on the
laws of England [William Blackstone], that the royal navy of
England hath ever been its greatest defence and ornament. It
is its ancient and natural strength; the floating bulwark of the
island; an army, from which, however strong and powerful,
no danger can be apprehended to liberty. Every American
citizen ought to cherish the same sentiment, as applicable to
the navy of his own country.41
Finally, let us revisit Lincoln's constitutional brief against se-
cession in his First Inaugural Address. Most twentieth-century
readers tend to focus on those passages in which Lincoln elevates
national majority rule over state majority rule, in perfect keeping
with the logic of Federalist 10, while ignoring other, more geostra-
tegic language:
Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove
our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassa-
ble wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced,
and go out of the presence, and beyond the reach of each
other; but the different parts of our country cannot do this.
They cannot but remain face to face; and intercourse, either
amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possi-
38 See, for example, Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Madison (Feb 8, 1786), in Ju-
lian P. Boyd, ed, 9 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 264-67 (Princeton, 1954); Letter to
James Madison (Dec 16, 1786), 10 id at 602-06; Letter to Edward Carrington (Aug 4, 1787),
11 id at 678-80.
39 See Morris, ed, Great Presidential Decisions at 54-65 (cited in note 33).
"0 Id at 82-99. Publius foreshadowed the Monroe Doctrine in a number of passages. See,
for example, Federalist 4 (Jay), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 48-50 (cited in
note 1); Federalist 5 (Jay), in id at 52-53; Federalist 7 (Hamilton), in id at 64-66; Federalist
16 (Hamilton), in id at 114; Federalist 18 (Madison and Hamilton), in id at 124, 127; Feder-
alist 19 (Madison and Hamilton), in id at 130-31; Federalist 41 (Madison), in id at 258-59;
Federalist 85 (Hamilton), in id at 521.
"' Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1191 at
78-79 (Hilliard, Gray, 1833) (citation omitted; emphasis added).
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ble then to make that intercourse more advantageous, or more
satisfactory, after separation than before? Can aliens make
treaties easier than friends can make laws? 42
Once we begin to attune ourselves to geostrategy, we can hear
in Lincoln's voice a whole set of implied concerns that we might
otherwise miss. After secession, might not antebellum strife about
which section would populate and control the resource-rich West
become even bloodier and more dangerous? Would not Southern
control of the mouth of the Mississippi River give it an economic
stranglehold over the entire region from the Appalachians to the
Rockies? Given that Northern states would no longer be bound by
the Fugitive Slave Clause, would not increasing numbers of slaves
flee northward? Would not Northern unwillingness to return these
slaves constitute a possible casus belli? What if the South tried to
staunch the outflow of slaves by blanketing the Mason-Dixon line
with security forces and slave-catching patrols? Suppose the North
responded by fortifying its side of the line with more soldiers?
Might the Old Powers of Europe seek to "mediate" or otherwise
intervene? And so on.
C. The Modern American Experience
It is not surprising that after a century of marginalization, 3
Federalist 10 was rediscovered and made central to our under-
standing of the Constitution. After the adoption and gradual judi-
cial invigoration of the Fourteenth Amendment, who could miss
the important constitutional principle of federal protection of local
minorities against their own state governments? And had not the
Civil War itself-understood ex post as a War Against Slavery,
rather than ex ante as a War For (Geographic) Union-shown the
national government to be the last, best hope of domestic liberty,
as Federalist 10 had prophesied?
What is remarkable, however, is the deep obscurity into which
Publius's earlier geostrategic vision has fallen, at least in law
4' Basler, ed, 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln at 269 (cited in note 2) (em-
phasis in original).
"I Douglass Adair has written that
it was not until 1913, 125 years [after its initial publication], that Charles A. Beard
made this particular essay famous for students of the United States Constitution.
Before [1913], practically no commentator on The Federalist or the Constitution, none
of the biographers of Madison, had emphasized Federalist 10 as of special importance
for understanding our 'more perfect union'. ...
Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers at 75-76 (cited in note 8).
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schools. For the issues raised by Federalists 4 through 8 and 41
have hardly disappeared, even though military technology has
changed drastically (especially with the advent of air power). Con-
sider only three examples from the last half-century. First, had the
Pacific "moat" not been so wide, bombs might have fallen on the
mainland rather than on Pearl Harbor. The United States in
World War II was unique among the Great Powers in having virtu-
ally no destruction occur on its own soil. Second, the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis once again illustrated the unique status of the United
States in keeping hostile land-based missiles out of our hemi-
sphere. The Monroe Doctrine was alive and well in 1962. Third,
Star Wars technology in the 1980s and 1990s again illustrates
America's unique geostrategic position. The system only makes
sense-that is, if it makes sense at all-because land-based mis-
siles aimed at United States targets must travel across the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans. Europeans are understandably less enthusias-
tic, for SDI offers them relatively little security so long as missiles
remain throughout Europe, East and West.44
Why has twentieth-century constitutional scholarship tended
to ignore Publius's. geostrategic vision? 45 In part, perhaps, it is be-
cause we may now think that the vision reflects imperialistic, if not
genocidal, attitudes towards Native Americans in the West. The
Monroe Doctrine may share more than initials with the American
idea of Manifest Destiny that took shape in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Perhaps modern-day discomfort and guilt among mainstream
constitutional theorists has led them to avert their eyes from geo-
strategic imperialism, just as they have downplayed the role of
slavery at the Founding.46
Another possible explanation for the marginalization of Pub-
lius's geostrategic vision is that it is less than obvious in the text of
the Constitution. Yet it is there. Article I, § 10 prevents states
from keeping troops or ships of war without congressional consent,
and § 8 prevents Congress from making long-term appropriations
44 The issue of submarine-based missiles raises complexities far beyond the scope of my
analysis here.
4' The work of my colleague Harold Koh is an important exception to this generaliza-
tion. See, for -example, Harold Koh, The National Security Constitution 77 (Yale, 1990)
("The birth of the National Security Constitution did not occur within a geopolitical vac-
uum. America's geographical separation from the rest of the world [has] figured... promi-
nently in the development of America's constitutional traditions."). See generally id at 67-
100.
4, For an excellent discussion of the importance of slavery at Philadelphia, see Ray-
mond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis on the Intent of a Pro-
Slavery Constitution, 42 Vand L Rev 93 (1989).
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for the army, but not the navy. As I have already noted, the suspi-
cion against armies in the Second Amendment has no anti-navy
counterpart, and the Third Amendment's language about
"soldiers" and not "sailors" reflects the prevailing Blackstonian or-
thodoxy that land forces posed a special threat to domestic liberty.
Despite all this, the geostrategic vision is undoubtedly less
central in constitutional case law than are principles like separa-,
tion of powers, judicial review, freedom of speech and of the press,
and due process. Traditional American lawyers are perhaps too
quick to attribute America's success over the last two centuries to
these doctrines simply because they are more justiciable.47
Nonlawyers, by contrast, at times argue that America's success
has had virtually nothing to do with its lawyers or its Constitution,
and everything to do with nonlegal factors-fertile land, navigable
waterways, good climate, and natural moats creating extraordinary
"peace dividends" for much of its history. Yet this argument also
oversimplifies. In England and Switzerland, geographic insulation
may have seemed natural and God-given, 4 but in America it was
self-consciously chosen. For Americans, the Atlantic Ocean is a po-
litical and not a natural moat. It became an effective moat only
because lawyers like Jay, Madison, Hamilton, and Wilson struc-
tured a continental legal structure that could make it so. The Mis-
sissippi River is today a bond of economic friendship rather than a
bone of military contention because a lawyer named Lincoln held
together a legal Union.
47 This is not to say that the geostrategic vision would never be relevant to judges de-
ciding cases. For example, the Insular Cases decided at the turn of the century were at the
time understood as raising perhaps the biggest constitutional question of the era: whether,
and how, the Constitution applied to various newly-acquired territories. The Court's ulti-
mate approach-distinguishing "distant ocean" communities from more contiguous territo-
ries (Balzac v Porto Rico, 258 US 298, 311 (1922))-is an interesting variation on Publius's
first argument. The Insular Cases have recently been the subject of two excellent studies,
neither of which, alas, analyzes them through the lens of Federalists 4 through 8. See Gary
Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 Cal L Rev 853 (1990);
Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L J 909 (1991).
48 This argument also oversimplifies in the case of England. The mother country's insu-
lar condition was achieved only through a self-conscious political union between Scotland
and England in 1707. Jay pointedly quoted the legislative history of this union, describing it
as effecting "[a]n entire and perfect union" that would enable the "whole island" to better
resist its foreign enemies. Federalist 5 (Jay), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 50
(cited in note 1). Jay here was clearly suggesting that the Philadelphia Constitution pro-
posed a similar "more perfect union" for similar reasons. Like the union of Scotland and
England, this union, once effected, was to be immune from unilateral secession. See gener-
ally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L J 1425, 1451-66 (1987).
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I propose, then, that serious students of our Constitution
adopt a more unified perspective. Economists, generals, and social
historians need to appreciate legal structure, and constitutional
lawyers need to widen their own field of vision symmetrically. We
need to recall that Chief Justice Jay was also Ambassador Jay, and
that Hamilton was a brilliant general and military strategist as
well as a first-rate trial lawyer and political theorist. Nor should we
ignore George Washington's constitutional ethos simply because he
lacked Hamilton's and Madison's knowledge of Hume and
Montesquieu.
D. Lessons for Europeans
So much, then, for twentieth-century lessons for those west of
the Atlantic. What is the message in all of this for Europeans
today?
The key point is this: the success of democracy in individual
countries depends heavily on demilitarization of the entire region.
Let us briefly recall some basic facts that every schoolchild in Eu-
rope learns. Apart from the Alps and Pyrenees, few natural geo-
graphic obstacles to invasion stand between the Urals and the At-
lantic. A man-made substitute for the Alps-the Maginot Line-
proved useless in World War II. (The real Alps, by contrast, ena-
bled Switzerland to escape occupation in each World War.4")
France and Germany have fought three wars against each other
since Napoleon. Mother Russia was invaded in both world wars,
and of course will never forget Napoleon either. England survived
the Nazi nightmare largely because of the slender sleeve of the
English Channeli Western capitalist nations are not inherently im-
mune from the totalitarianism of a Mussolini or a Hitler, or from
the massive destruction of total war-and the two scourges are
often related, as the 1930s and 1940s made clear.
Now consider the extraordinary success of NATO. I am not
referring to the containment of communist expansion to Eastern
Europe, the ostensible purpose of the alliance. Rather, I am refer-
ring to pacific relations within the alliance-the containment of
military adventurism (or to be more precise, intra-European mili-
tary adventurism) among member nations. Member nations point
their armaments outwards, not at each other. NATO has served
well a function similar to that of the United States government
and the United States Constitution as envisioned by Publius's first
argument.
9 Publius would not have been surprised. See note 19.
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But the map of Europe has changed dramatically. The Wall
has fallen in Germany, and cannot be replaced by a wall around
Germany. Some legal structure, such as NATO, is needed now
more than ever to reassure Germany's neighbors (France, Poland,
and ultimately, the Soviet Union) that their soil will never again be
invaded by Germany or any other nation. Interestingly, one of the
final hurdles to German unification was Poland's insistence on a
formal commitment that the newly enlarged Germany would re-
spect Poland's contemporary borders.50 Poland's fears illustrate
that ancient military risks are believed to persist on the continent
today. And while the Kohl regime's willingness to calm those fears
is admirable, any government is more likely to break such a com-
mitment in the absence of collective security agreements.
To be sure, military technology has changed dramatically in
recent years, esp'ecially with the advent of long-range missiles and
smart bombs, but most wars are still fought between geographic
neighbors and at great risk to civilian populations. Some regional
mechanism is therefore needed to maintain a peaceful neighbor-
hood in central Europe.
Yet even if this much were achieved by keeping a unified Ger-
many within NATO or through some other legal structure, Eastern
Europe's geostrategic posture would remain wholly different from
that of the United States. There is of course no moat between the
NATO countries and those to the east. To follow fully the New
World example, the Old World needs to develop transnational le-
gal structures to demilitarize the entire continent, East as well as
West. The elimination of missiles would of course be much desired
by those who hate war and massive destruction. But for those who
hate tyranny, the dismantling of tanks and armies is perhaps even
more important. These can all too easily be used domestically to
crush the citizenry, as the inhabitants of Budapest, Prague, and
Vilnius know all too well.
50 See Thomas L. Friedman, Evolution in Europe: 2 Germanies Vow to Retain Border
with the Poles, NY Times Al (July 18, 1990); Karl Kaiser, Germany's Unification, 70 For-
eign Affairs 179 (1990).
51 A vigorous debate about the proper form of collective security arrangements for the
new Europe is now underway, with numerous voices suggesting an enhanced role for the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. See, for example, Robert E. Hunter,
The Future of European Security, 13 Wash Q 55 (1990). My point here is not to advocate
greater use of the CSCE or any other particular structure, but to suggest that the American
constitutional analogy provides a powerful argument in favor of such arrangements in
general.
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NATO has not been the only transnational structure in the
post-war era helping to preserve peace among western European
nations. The European Economic Community, the Common Mar-
ket, has also played a key role in facilitating economic cooperation
and coordination. The idea of free trade within the European Con-
tinent can be understood as an Old World adaptation of the New
World constitutional idea of intracontinental free trade embodied
in the dormant commerce clause. 52
Indeed, The Federalist Papers illustrate how economic coop-
eration and demilitarization went hand in hand under the Federal-
ist Constitution. In Federalists 4 and 6, Publius noted that percep-
tions of unfair trading practices were among the classic causes of
war." Free and fair trade, by contrast, would redirect citizens' en-
ergies into commercial intercourse that would strengthen ties
among Americans from different regions.5 4 Free trade would also
encourage a domestic shipping industry and make America a
"nursery of seamen," argued Publius.5 5 In time of war, America's
commercial fleet could be converted into an American navy
through letters of marque and reprisal.5 6 And the synergy worked
in both directions; an incipient navy would be indispensable in
protecting America's commercial navigation from European and
piratical attack. "[B]y a kind of reaction, mutually beneficial," na-
vies and commercial navigation "promote each other. ' 57 Finally,
expanding the geographic sphere of government by bringing 13 na-
tions under a single continental umbrella would reduce the total
amount of money needed for military defense and thereby help
promote the economy. Just as Federalist 10 argued that there were
certain economies of scale in representative government, so too
Federalists 4 through 8 argued that economies of scale existed in
military affairs. The geostrategic point can almost be recast into a
geometric point: defense expenditures often correlate with the
82 US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3 (by its terms, empowering Congress to regulate interstate
commerce; commonly interpreted to also forbid state regulations that excessively burden
interstate commerce). I am using the dormant commerce clause here merely as shorthand
for the intricate network of constitutional provisions promoting economic cooperation and
coordination among states.
'3 Federalist 4 (Jay), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 46-47 (cited in note 1);
Federalist 6 (Hamilton), in id at 54.
" See, for example, Federalist 53 (Madison), in id at 334; see generally Martin Dia-
mond, The Federalist's View of Federalism, in Essays on Federalism 21, 49-51 (Institute
for Studies on Federalism, 1961); Wills, Explaining America at 67-78 (cited in note 8).
11 Federalist 11 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 88-89 (cited in
note 1). The "nursery" image is from Federalist 4 (Jay), in id at 48.
US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 11.
5 Federalist 11 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 89 (cited in note
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length of a border (perimeter) that must be defended. A larger
area has, ceteris paribus, a lower perimeter-to-area ratio. To put
the point another way, the need to spend money to guard intra-
continental borders between states is largely eliminated by union.
The key point for Europeans today is that internal constitu-
tional reform is not enough. Continental legal institutions like the
EEC and NATO must be developed or expanded to create a conti-
nental environment conducive to commerce and demilitarization.
II. FEDERALISM
The EEC and NATO offer Europeans one model analogous to
the Founding of the United States Constitution-a model in which
formerly distinct nation-states combine to create continental legal
structures to restrain military adventurism and promote economic
cooperation. For the relatively small former Soviet satellites in
Eastern Europe, these models merit careful study. For the Soviet
Union itself, however, the procedural and geostrategic posture is
somewhat different. In the Soviet case, a legal structure spanning a
continent-indeed, a continent and a half-already exists. The
question is not whether the Soviets should create continental legal
structures, but how much autonomy the Soviets should allow to
the individual republics that comprise the union. Similar concerns
apply to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the two Eastern Euro-
pean nations with federal systems; both are experiencing severe
pressures from subunits, at least some of which prefer
independence.
The geostrategic argument rehearsed thus far does not seem
fully responsive to these issues. In Federalists 4 through 8, Publius
gives reasons for creating a Union, but what are his arguments for
preserving states as independent entities, rather than simply aban-
doning them? In other words, why in Federalist 9 does Publius la-
bel himself a Federalist-one who favors retaining states-rather
than a pure Nationalist?5 And do any of Publius's arguments help
us understand how the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugosla-
via should structure their federal-state relations today?
58 Publius and other supporters of the Constitution may well have appropriated the
Federalist label for rhetorical and political advantage. See Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1426 & n 9
(cited in note 48). Nevertheless, Publius was emphatically a Federalist in the sense of "one
who favors retaining states," which is of course the sense in which Publius himself invokes
the Federalist label. See Federalist 9 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at
76 (cited in note 1) (defining federal system as one in which "separate organization of the
members be not abolished"); Federalist 10 (Madison), in id at 84 (closing essay with self-
description of Publius as a "federalist[]").
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As with separation of powers, the key value of federalism for
Publius is that government officials guard against each other's ex-
cesses and thereby protect the liberty of ordinary citizens. Central
officials- can protect citizens against state governments whenever
the states become tyrannical. State officials can return the compli-
ment when the central government oversteps its constitutional
bounds. The key to this dynamic is that each government must
retain a certain degree of institutional autonomy-a measure of
structural independence-from the other.
We must not confuse federalism, as thus defined, with decen-
tralization.5 9 Many of the common cliches about the benefits of
"federalism" actually have little to do with the idea of federalism,
strictly speaking. States can indeed "experiment" by passing dif-
ferent laws whose results can be monitored and assessed. But a
centralized government could run the same kind of experiments
among geographically defined "provinces" whose governments hold
office at the pleasure of the center. Indeed, if experimentation is
our chief desideratum, a purely pyramidic government structure
may well be preferable, enabling central planners to shape and
reshape government boundaries and policies for more carefully
controlled experiments. Next, consider the idea that cultural, lin-
guistic, geographic, economic, political, and other types of diversity
may require different legal rules for different regions, at least on
some issues. A nonfederal system can often accommodate this di-
versity; central officials can simply commit certain decisions to re-
gional and local deputies. Similarly, federal systems are not the
only ones that enable individuals to select their preferred set of
laws by "voting with their feet.""0
The best argument for federalism, then, is neither experimen-
tation, nor diversity, nor residential self-selection, but protection
against abusive government. Just as competition among firms pro-
tects consumers from monopolistic exploitation, and competition
among political parties protects voters from the insensitivity and
oppression characteristic of one-party regimes, so too a healthy
competition between federal and local officials can help protect cit-
'9 In an otherwise helpful discussion of federalism, Professor McConnell fails to distin-
guish sharply between these two concepts. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating
the Founders' Design, 54 U Chi L Rev 1484 (1987) (review of Raoul Berger, Federalism:
The Founders' Design (Oklahoma, 1987)). For a useful corrective, see Andrzej Rapaczynski,
From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 S Ct
Rev 341, 390, 408-14.




izens against government tyranny."1 Elsewhere, I have tried to offer
a detailed explanation of how the federalist dynamic built into the
United States Constitution works to protect liberty.6 2 I shall there-
fore only summarize my findings here, with particular emphasis on
those aspects most appropriate for, and appropriable by, Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union today.
A. The "Legal Check" of Federalism
First, American federalism encompasses a legal and remedial
dimension. A written constitution proclaiming itself the supreme
law needs some mechanisms of legal enforcement. Judicial review
is probably the best known of these mechanisms, but not the only
one; it is simply one part of a larger system of separation of powers
in which each branch of the national government can typically
thwart a national law it deems unconstitutional-especially in the
area of criminal law, where persons' lives, liberty, and property are
most vulnerable. If either the House or the Senate finds a criminal
bill unconstitutional-even for reasons that might not persuade
judges-the bill cannot become law. And the federal courts cannot
convict a person in the absence of such a law, because there is no
such thing as a "federal common law" of crimes. If, in the exercise
of his independent judgment and regardless of case law, the Presi-
dent thinks the bill unconstitutional, he may veto or pardon (even
before indictment). The structure of separation of powers thus
protects constitutional values by providing three separate, overlap-
ping, and mutually reinforcing remedies-legislative, executive,
and judicial-against arguably unconstitutional federal conduct.
" So too, competition between institutions of church and state can promote liberty.
When both religious and secular authority are monopolized by the same entity, tyranny is
much more likely. Soviet absolutism after the revolution flowed rather naturally from Rus-
sion absolutism under the czars, with Communist Atheism replacing Christianity as the Offi-
cial State Religion, and the Communist Party replacing the Church as the Official State
Institution for Correct Thinking. To put the point another way, in Western Europe, liberty
over the last thousand years benefited from various modes of competition between King and
Pope for their subjects' allegiance; in the old Russian Empire, liberty suffered under czars
who claimed both roles.
Recent events only further confirm the basic point. The avalanche in Eastern Europe in
the 1980s might well not have occurred without the stone of Poland. But the Polish Revolu-
tion would not have been possible without Walesa and Solidarity-who in turn would not
have been possible without the support of a Polish Pope and a strong Polish Catholic
Church. John Paul II-who lives in the West, but grew up in the East-is truly one of the
unsung heroes of the European Revolution.
6" See generally Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1492-1519 (cited in note 48).
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A similar mechanism of overlapping protection from legal
wrongs operates in the structure of federalism. If a state govern-
ment violates a citizen's constitutional rights, the victim need not
depend solely on whatever remedies the state provides; she can
also invoke remedies furnished by the federal government, struc-
turally independent of the wrongdoing regime. Section 1983 is the
best example of this.6  Conversely, when federal officials violate the
Constitution, the victim can once again often invoke remedial law
furnished by a structurally independent government-here, the
state. For example, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Biv-
ens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics,64 victims seeking damages for federal Fourth Amendment vio-
lations relied almost exclusively on state trespass law. Moreover,
the Seventh Amendment allows local juries, which also enjoy struc-
tural independence from the wrongdoing government, to hear these
damages actions. As Alexis de Tocqueville argued at length, juries
can benefit not only the aggrieved citizens who bring cases before
them, but also the citizens who serve on them, offering them a
chance to participate in government and to learn democracy by do-
ing democracy.65 In one form or another, the jury system of lay
participation is therefore doubly deserving of adoption/adaption in
Eastern Europe. 6
63 42 USC § 1983 (1988) ("Every person who, under color of [state law] subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.") This statute is now, of course, the principal legal tool
for enforcement of constitutional rights by individual litigants.
- 403 US 388 (1971).
" Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 280-87 (Knopf, 1963). For more dis-
cussion of the jury's role in the antebellum era, see Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1150-51, 1178-99
(cited in note 34).
66 My colleague John Langbein has thoughtfully analyzed various continental alterna-
tives to and adaptations of the Anglo-American jury. See, for example, John H. Langbein,
Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?,
1981 Am Bar Found Res J 195. Professor Langbein is less enthusiastic about the American
jury system than I am, in part, I suspect, because he judges the jury primarily by its ability
to serve adjudicatory values. In contrast, I follow de Tocqueville in conceptualizing the jury
primarily as a "political" and not a mere "judicial" instrument-that is, as a device whose
primary benefit redounds to the jurors and not the parties. See, for example, de Tocqueville,
1 Democracy in America at 285 (cited in note 65) (Jury is a "gratuitous public school, ever
open, in which every juror learns his rights.... I do not know whether the jury is useful to
those who have lawsuits, but I am certain it is highly beneficial to those who judge them;
and I look upon it as one of the most efficacious means for the education of the people
which society can employ.").
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B. The "Military Check" of Federalism
The above arguments presuppose the regular functioning of
courts of law to remedy unconstitutional conduct. But can federal-
ism address the worst-case scenario, in which a tyrannical govern-
ment throws down the mask of legitimacy, shuts down courts of
law, and attempts to rule by brute military force? Here too feder-
alism can indeed help, and in a way analogous to the horizontal
separation of powers. Just as our Constitution divided control of
military power among branches of the national government to bet-
ter secure against tyranny-making the President commander-in-
chief, but giving Congress sole power to declare war, appropriate
military funds, and pass rules for the regulation of military
forces-so too the document divided military power vertically be-
tween state and federal government. The Constitution authorized
the central government to establish a national army, but gave state
governments a special role in training the members and appointing
the officers of the countervailing institution of the militia. Accord-
ing to Publius in Federalists 28 and 46, the national government
could use its army to put down any purely local insurrection
threatening the republican government of a single state; con-
versely, an alliance of local militias led by state governments might
thwart any genuine scheme of national tyranny-much as militias
organized by colonial governments had successfully resisted the
British army during the Revolution. 17
Like virtually all other constitutional principles, the "military
check" of federalism can be abused. During the 1860s, for example,
Southern state governments resorted to their state militias even
though none of the constitutional prerequisites for this ultimate
form of self-help had been met. Lincoln occupied the presidency
by virtue of lawful election, the people's ordinary representatives
in Congress were lawfully sitting and open to hear any Southern
grievances, and courts of law were open to adjudicate any claims of
federal illegality. Nor could secessionists even plausibly allege that
the Lincoln government had engaged in unconstitutional action.
Unlike the revolutionaries of 1776, the rebels of 1861 were unable
to draft any convincing Declaration of Independence "submitting"
to a "candid world" "facts" documenting central tyranny. To make
matters even worse, the Southern governments based their claimed
right of unilateral secession on an unpersuasive reading of the Con-
' Federalist 28 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 181 (cited in note
1); Federalist 46 (Madison), in id at 298-300.
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stitution's underlying structure. In light of the geostrategic vision
discussed above, Lincoln's arguments against unilateral secession
appear considerably more plausible than Jefferson Davis's argu-
ments on the other side. Only a national majority, not a majority
of a single state or region, can lawfully dissolve the American
Union."
Despite the American experience during the Civil War, East-
ern Europe and especially the Soviet Union should consider some
form of military power-sharing between center and periphery. If
we look only at those rare occasions when the American states
have actually deployed their militias against the national army,
with the Civil War as Exhibit A, we get a skewed picture of the
value of the military check of federalism. The most important role
of the militia is not to take the field but to deter would-be tyrants.
For this purpose, large, organized state militias are probably un-
necessary and even dangerous. Rather, the simple existence of
small (but expandable) popular "shadow" forces organized by state
governments could discourage the central government's abuse of
its much larger and more professional standing army, much as a
would-be monopolist must take into account not only actual com-
petitors but shadow competitors organized to enter the market if
prices rise too high.
Perhaps the finest hour of the military check occurred at one
of the most delicate moments of the new nation's first constitu-
tional crisis. After increasing political acrimony between former
revolutionary comrades led to a schism within the ruling elite, the
dominant group (the Federalists, led by President John Adams6")
tried.to purge political dissidents (the emerging Republican Party,
championed by Vice President Thomas Jefferson) using the notori-
ous Alien and Sedition Acts. After a bitterly fought presidential
ea See Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1455-62 & n 162 (cited in note 48); Akhil Reed Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U Chi L Rev
1043, 1053 n 28, 1062 n 69, 1076 (1988).
For a discussion of the secession issue in the context of Eastern Europe today, see Cass
R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U Chi L Rev 633 (1991). Professor Sun-
stein's arguments against secession draw directly on the Federalist 10 tradition: he claims
that (among its many drawbacks) a constitutional right to secede will tend to exacerbate
factional conflict by increasing the bargaining power 6f particular subunits and the ethnic or
religious groups that dominate them. As I hope the discussion in the text demonstrates, one
can (and should) make an equally compelling case against secession as a constitutional mat-
ter by drawing on the geostrategic vision of Federalists 4 through 8.
"9 Actually, Adams's role was more ambivalent and ultimately much more judicious
than the one played by High Federalists like Alexander Hamilton and Timothy Pickering.
See generally Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System 102-21 (California, 1969).
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election, the Republicans emerged victorious in the electoral col-
lege, but certain quirks of voting and counting threw the issue into
the hands of a Federalist-dominated House of Representatives.
There was concern that Congress might try to evade its clear Arti-
cle II duty O to select between Jefferson and Aaron Burr, the two
(Republican) candidates who had tied for first place in the elec-
toral college.
Suppose Congress had voted for Adams instead, or had simply
refused to vote for either Burr or Jefferson, thereby maintaining
Adams in office by dint of the inertia of occupancy? These un-
happy scenarios never materialized, no doubt in part because of
honor among leading Federalists, but perhaps also because of the
latent military check of federalism. The national army was small,
and leading Republican governors made clear that any defiance of
the mandates of Article II would oblige state militias to take the
field to resist such blatant and lawless election-stealing. 71 The
growls of the state watchdogs sufficed; bites proved unnecessary.
The result was a truly extraordinary spectacle-a peaceful transfer
of power from one party to another, only recently its mortal en-
emy, in obedience to the will of the people on election day. We
take all this for granted today, but such an event was virtually un-
precedented in 1800. The eyes of the world were upon America,
and Americans gave the world a stunning lesson in democracy.
C. The "Political Check" of Federalism
Federalism's role in the triumph of democracy in the election
of 1800 was not limited to the latent military check evident at the
end. In the years preceding the election, state governments had ex-
emplified what I shall call the "political check" of federal-
ism-speaking out against federal policies they deemed tyrannical
and unconstitutional, and seeking to mobilize political opposition
to the Adams Administration. Most dramatic were the famous Vir-
ginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-99 denouncing the Alien
and Sedition Acts. Criticism of a congressional statute may seem
mundane in 1991; in 1798, however, anyone who criticized the Se-
dition Act risked criminal prosecution under it, notwithstanding
the clear words of the First Amendment protecting freedom of
speech and of the press. But state legislators had two advantages
70 US Const, Art II, § 1, cl 3.
71 See Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System at 109, 111, 131 n 10 (cited in note 69);
Dumas Malone, 4 Jefferson and His Time 6-11 (Little, Brown, 1970).
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over ordinary citizens or newspaper publishers. First, they could
invoke a long tradition of absolute "freedom of speech and debate"
in legislative chambers from executive or judicial interference.7 2
Second, in addition to the old separation of powers principle, legis-
lators in Virginia and Kentucky could use new institutions of fed-
eralism to shield themselves. Any federal imprisonment of state
legislators would have risked arousing state militias, whose officers
the state governments had appointed (in many cases, from the
ranks of state civilian officials).
Thus, state governments in 1798-99 played a role similar to
that of the institutional press or the opposition party today: moni-
toring the conduct of officials in power, and coordinating opposi-
tion to central policies deemed undesirable. Indeed, the strong
First Amendment protection today enjoyed by the American press
is in part a legacy of the success of state legislative action in 1798-
99, as the Supreme Court implied when it invoked the Alien and
Sedition Act controversy in its landmark opinion in New York
Times v Sullivan.73 So too, as Richard Hofstadter has written, fed-
eralism was an indispensable midwife at the birth of the party sys-
tem in America.74
This last point is an especially significant one for Eastern Eu-
rope, for a similar dynamic may well be unfolding in the Soviet
Union today. Opposition groups may be able to challenge the he-
gemony of the Communist Party by winning control of the machin-
ery of local governments. Moreover, states furnish opponents of
national policy with an opportunity to secure actual hands-on ex-
perience running government, thereby strengthening their credibil-
ity as qualified candidates in the next set of national elections. In
America, for example, two of our last three presidents (Carter and
Reagan) ousted incumbents by convincing the electorate that they
had been successful chief executives in their home states. The
third (Bush) won in part by attacking the record of his opponent
(Dukakis) as a state governor. In a nonfederal system, by contrast,
most plausible candidates who would challenge an entrenched na-
tional leadership must do so from either a minority shadow gov-
ernment position within the national government, or a leadership
position outside government, such as Lech Walesa's leadership of
Solidarity. To put the point bluntly, the federal structure of the
USSR may enable Soviet citizens considering alternatives to
2 See Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1151 & nn 96-97 (cited in note 34).
73 376 US 254, 273-76 (1964).
7' Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System at 103, 131, 179 (cited in note 69).
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Gorbachev to see whether Boris Yeltsin is truly capable of gov-
erning important affairs or is unable to run anything except his
mouth.
D. A Key Difference? Federalism and Tribalism
There is, however, at least one major difference between feder-
alism in the United States, and federalism in the USSR and (per-
haps to a lesser degree) the rest of Eastern Europe. In America,
state boundaries have rarely strongly correlated with deep ethnic,
cultural, religious, and linguistic divisions. Surely, the United
States contains some states today that are in important ways dis-
tinctive-for example, Hawaii and Utah-but American states
seem far more assimilated than many Soviet republics and the eth-
nic regions of some Eastern European countries.75 Before the world
wars, African Americans were far more geographically concen-
trated in the former slave states of the South, but at that time
they were largely excluded from the polity (at first de jure, and
later de facto). And at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
there was some cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity
that corresponded to state boundaries. For example, one third of
Pennsylvanians spoke German, and in 1794 Congress seriously con-
sidered German language statutes in Congress. 76 Congregationalists
dominated New England, while Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Vir-
ginia were Quaker, Catholic, and Anglican strongholds, respec-
tively. Nevertheless, there was enough homogeneity-among
whites, that is-for Jay to be able to say with a straight face in
Federalist 2:
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected coun-
try to one united people-a people descended from the same
ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same
religion, attached to the same principles of government, [and]
very similar in their manners and customs .... 7
Full exploration of the United States experience in federalism in
cases where ethnic or religous differences have loomed
large-consider, once again, Hawaii and Utah, or the American
Bantustans called Indian Reservations 78-is beyond the scope of
75 For more discussion, see Sunstein, 58 U Chi L Rev at 643-47 (cited in note 68).
76 Warren, The Supreme Court and the Sovereign States at 10 (cited in note 32).
77 Federalist 2 (Jay), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 38 (cited in note 1).
78 Professor Judith Resnik has recently offered a very thoughtful essay on the ways in
which the Native American experience can help to deepen-and render problematic-our
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this essay. Even without a detailed study, though, it is clear that
American federalism has not been unproblematic when the pre-
mise of Federalist 2 has been wholly lacking. Perhaps the best-if
sobering-New World lessons for the Old World on this topic may
come from America's neighbor to the north, Canada.
III. CIVILIAN SUPREMACY'
Military subordination to rules established by civilian officials
is a principle that Americans take for granted today. The Founders
enjoyed no such luxury. Popular histories of classical antiquity
were filled with examples of military men such as Darius and Cae-
sar wresting sceptres for themselves, and recent English history
gave little cause for optimism. Had not Cromwell used his army to
establish himself as Lord Protector? Nor did the American Revolu-
tion appear at some magical endpoint of the era of military coups.
Less than a decade after former revolutionary General Washington
peacefully, even eagerly, relinquished his position as American
president and commander-in-chief, former revolutionary General
Bonaparte proclaimed himself emperor in Paris. Even today, one
regularly hears serious discussion about whether the Soviet Army
leadership will accept the changes being orchestrated by the politi-
cal leadership, or will instead attempt to take matters into its own
hands.
In America, however, such discussions have been much less
frequent and serious over the last 200 years. America's geostrategic
position deserves some of the credit. Until its emergence as a
global superpower after World War II, the United States got by
with only a small standing army in peacetime-a happy situation
made possible by America's unique geographic isolation from the
Old Powers of Europe and their militaries. The smaller the domes-
tic army, the less the threat of a coup. The military check of feder-
alism may also have contributed to the impressive record of re-
straint compiled by American generals. As noted earlier, the most
important function of the militia is to deter army adventurism by
lowering the odds of its success.
But what accounts for civilian supremacy in America today,
when we do have a sizable national standing army and when it
would be fanciful to argue that independent state militias counter-
understandings of words like "federalism" and "sovereignty" in American constitutional dis-
course. See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Courts, 56 U Chi L Rev 671 (1989).
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poise it? The constitutional text 79 provides an obvious but only
partial explanation. Tradition also seems to loom large here. It is
nothing new to suggest that human beings are largely creatures of
habit. Hamilton, for example, listed "the habitual sense of obliga-
tion" as one of the five most important explanations of obedience
to authority in his most extended speech at the Philadelphia con-
vention.80 And nowhere is habit more self-consciously cultivated
than in the military, where soldiers are drilled and redrilled until
they perform tasks by rote. Nor is any habit more cultivated in the
military than that of near-reflexive obedience to one's duly consti-
tuted superiors.
Indeed, the force of habit explains why soldiers with guns are
so much more dangerous to fellow citizens than policemen with
guns. Police are trained to deal with ordinary civilians, to calm dis-
putants, to cool heated arguments, to use discretion and situation
sense. Soldiers, by contrast, are trained to destroy a disciplined en-
emy, to obey orders unthinkingly, to shoot on command, and to
shoot to kill. And when soldiers are used domestically as police
substitutes, and brought face to face with fellow citizens rather
than enemy soldiers, tragedy can result-from the Boston Massa-
cre in 1770 to Kent State exactly 200 years later,8' from
Tiananmen to Timisoara.
In America, the military's tradition of almost-blind obedience
has always encompassed as a first principle that the highest duly
constituted authority is a civilian commander-in-chief selected by
peaceful political means without the flexing of military muscle. But
how did this tradition establish itself in America? In much of the
world, after all, the military "tradition" is just the opposite. The
idea of a coup is hardly unthinkable, and once thought leads to
successful action, it is hard to put the genie back in the bottle; one
good coup deserves another. Yet America has never had such a
military putsch. Even in the Civil War, the issue was ultimately
one of which set of civilian officials and which civilian elector-
ate-state or national-was indeed constitutionally supreme. Mili-
tary men like Robert E. Lee followed political leaders like Jeffer-
son Davis, not the reverse.
7' See, for example, US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 11-15 (vesting in Congress the powers to
declare war, to maintain and govern the army and navy, and to call up the militia in time of
insurrection or invasion), and US Const, Art II, § 2, cl 1 (making the president commander-
in-chief).
80 Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 305 (cited in note
28).
81 See David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Mil-
itary Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 Iowa L Rev 1 (1971).
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Perhaps a different tradition might have taken root in late
eighteenth-century America had it not been for George Washing-
ton. In 1783, several of Washington's officers appear to have been
planning a military takeover of power from the incompetent Con-
gress then trying to govern under the weak Articles of Confedera-
tion.8 2 But upon learning of the- plot, Washington would have no
part of it. He chose the role not of Caesar or Cromwell, but of
Cincinnatus, the famous Roman soldier who left his plow to be-
come a general and save his city, but who quickly surrendered his
uniform after the fighting ended and returned to his farm.
The details of Washington's conduct during the so-called
Newburgh Affair of 1783 may not have been widely known in the
late 1780s, but Washington's commitment to civilian supremacy
was legendary. America's first president was indeed a general, but
as president he made clear that his civilian role predominated. He
even dressed the part, for as president, Washington wore civilian
clothes, not a military uniform. He offers a marked contrast to
three men of our era who, like Washington, graduated from revolu-
tionary generalships to become chief executives of newly founded
regimes: Franco, Mao, and Castro. Washington's self-conscious
dress was not simply a reflection of military inability brought on
by age; as president, Washington personally took the field to lead
federal troops in putting down the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.3
Rather, Washington self-consciously tried to teach his country and
the world a lesson about civilian supremacy. He may not have had
a way with words, but his actions-and even his garb-spoke
volumes.
Exemplified by men like Washington and Robert E. Lee, com-
mander of the Confederate forces in the Civil War, this tradition of
civilian supremacy lives on today among the American military.
The ethos is given institutional form in military schools like West
Point and Annapolis, and the Virginia school for civilians named
after the two generals noted above. Just as a legal ethic of judicial
review, judicial restraint, and the rule of law is institutionalized in
stories about John Marshall told in today's law schools (including
one that bears his name), so too an ethic of civilian supremacy
draws importantly on didactic narratives about men like George
82 For accounts of this event, see Merrill Jensen, The New Nation 69-72 (Knopf, 1950);
Garry Wills, Cincinnatus: George Washington and the Enlightenment 5-9 (Doubleday,
1984).
88 See Morris, ed, Great Presidential Decisions at 22-28 (cited in note 33).
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Washington. And these narratives are not merely relics of the nine-
teenth century. When a general openly challenges civilian author-
ity, as Douglas MacArthur challenged Truman after World War II,
it may irreparably damage his reputation, even if the challenge
falls far short of a coup. There are, to my knowledge, no American
military schools or colleges named after MacArthur.
How can comparable traditions be established or strengthened
in Eastern Europe? As in the American experience, constitutional
texts provide an appropriate starting point. There is at least some
cause for optimism on this score; several of the constitutions re-
cently adopted or now under discussion in Eastern Europe specifi-
cally forbid military intervention in domestic affairs without the
express authorization of parliament or the chief executive.8 4 Again,
though, it is worth emphasizing that the text alone is a mere
parchment barrier. The regional demilitarization suggested earlier
will of course help by shrinking the size of the Eastern European
military machines. So too, the strengthening of democratic politi-
cal procedures may prove critical; arguably, the more legitimate
and popular the military perceives the civilian leadership to be, the
higher the perceived cost of attempting a coup. If Gorbachev had a
direct mandate from the Soviet electorate, might not his position
vis-A-vis the military be that much more secure?
Finally, serious attention must be paid to the institutions of
military training. Some of the issues here are structural. For exam-
ple, the United States has deployed "competition" among military
schools, leading to a type of "separation of powers" among the mil-
itary services-army, navy, air force, and marines. This separation
is widely thought to have diminished the efficiency of American
military planning, particularly in matters like procurement and
weapons development. But we have tolerated whatever inefficien-
cies may have resulted in part because the separation also discour-
ages democracy-threatening cabal and intrigue. Other issues are
more pedagogic. How can military academies best teach and inter-
nalize the principles of democracy and civilian supremacy?
8'4 See, for example, the new Hungarian Constitution, Art 19, § 3(j) (on file with U Chi
L Rev) (Parliament decides on use of armed forces "inside or outside the country"). See also
Romanian Parliament Committee for Drafting the Constitution of Romania, Theses for the
Draft Constitution of Romania 6, Title I, § 13 (ROMPRES National News Agency, 1990)
(on file with U Chi L Rev) (proposing that military may be used internally "in defence of
the Constitutional order and the protection of the fundamental civil rights and liberties,"
but only when "explicitly provided for by law," "for a limited time and with a pre-set pur-
pose," and with the authorization of the Supreme Council of National Defence, a body
under the parliament's control).
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CONCLUSION
Publius and Lincoln were right. The American experiment in
self-rule does indeed yield important lessons for all humankind in
search of a more free, a more democratic, a more peaceful, and a
more prosperous world. Some of these New World lessons, such as
the importance of federalism and jury trial, can perhaps be de-
duced by a simple reading of the Constitution itself. Other lessons
are more subtle, for they radiate far beyond the four corners of the
document. For example, we need to understand how international
and geostrategic concerns affect the domestic legal order, and how
unwritten traditions and precedents established at or near the
founding may prove even more powerful than a constitution's na-
ked text. The establishment of new constitutions in individual
Eastern European countries can only set the stage. The second act
of the drama must involve the development of continental legal
structures and stable domestic traditions of mutual tolerance, "and
executive and military self-restraint.
The words of Federalist 1, with which I began this essay, ap-
peared in New York newspapers on October 27, 1787.5 Five days
earlier, Benjamin Franklin-a framer who had spent considerable
time in both the Old and the New Worlds-sent a letter to a Euro-
pean friend that also alluded to the global implications of the pro-
posed American Constitution. Modern-day Europeans would do
well to ponder Franklin's evocative words:
If [our Constitution] succeeds, I do not see why you might not
in Euro'pe carry the project of good Henry the 4th into execu-
tion, by forming a Federal Union and One Grand Republic of
all its different states and kingdom[s] by means of a like
Convention.86
See Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at viii (cited in note 1) (editor's
introduction).
S Benjamin Franklin, Letter to M. Grand (Oct 22, 1787), quoted in Warren, The Su-
preme Court and the Sovereign States at 145-46 n 41 (cited in note 32).
